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Following its establishment in 1952, both the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity and its successor, the European Union, have served as  models for 
other regional organisations. Yet,  recent crises of the European Union – in-
cluding of migration, the common  currency, and of Brexit – call into  question 
the continued viability of this status. While these crises have tainted the 
European Union’s success, predictions of its irrelevance and demise are 
nevertheless premature.
 • European Union-type institutions are becoming more widespread in other 
parts of the world, including authoritative dispute settlement mechanisms, 
general secretariats with agenda-setting power, and parliamentary assemblies. 
 • These developments are due, in part, to the European Union’s success as well as 
to its active promotion of regional integration in other parts of the world. The 
European Union actively promotes regionalism through financial and technical 
assistance as well as via the negotiation of interregional agreements. 
 • Nevertheless, European Union-type institutions seldom generate comparably 
positive outcomes to those in Europe itself because of other regions’ greater 
concerns about national sovereignty, as well as different economic, political, 
and social contexts. 
 • Recent crises in the European Union have tainted outsiders’ perceptions of it 
as a model of specific policy regimes; yet, the most fundamental problem has 
crystallised in Brexit, which expresses principled opposition to the very idea of 
regional cooperation. Nevertheless, the notion that regional cooperation can 
help nation states to secure peace and enhance economic prosperity continues 
to be most prominently embodied by the European Union – remaining an at-
tractive one in a world in which conflict and poverty are still pervasive.
Policy Implications
Policymakers in Europe should realise that the attractiveness of the European 
Union model of regional economic integration is an important form of soft 
 power, one that they should be ready to harness. At the same time, this appeal’s 
endurance depends primarily on the European Union’s ability to continue  solving 
internal problems and coping with crises – where the largest threats to its posi-
tive image now come from.
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The European Union Model of Regional Cooperation Has Spread 
around the World …
When a group of policymakers decided to transform Western Europe’s  international 
relations in the mid-twentieth century in order to escape the scourge of “total war” 
and nationalist hysteria, they opted for a novel approach: the gradual integra-
tion of national economies under the guidance of supranational institutions. This 
unique approach to regional cooperation provided a “new ideology of integration” 
(Parsons 2002: 48) by steering a middle ground between federation – that is, the 
 fusing of national states into a single polity with some autonomy on the part of the 
units themselves – and traditional forms of “loose” intergovernmental cooperation. 
 Today, other regions have started to follow this European Union (EU) model.
maybe the most distinctive element of the EU model is its set of supranational 
institutions. Three are key: the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a “trailblazer of 
supranational adjudication” (Hooghe et al. 2017: 589) since its inception in 1952; 
the European Commission, with executive competences and exclusive agenda-set-
ting power; and, the European Parliament (EP), a body composed of (today directly 
elected) national parliamentarians who participate in regional decision-making. 
All of these institutions have spread, to different degrees and in varying combina-
tions, to other regions around the world. Whereas they were literally unique in the 
1950s, they have become more common today – even though the EU model is by 
no means the “standard” one of regional cooperation. The following graphs, which 
are based on the measure of International Authority (mIA) dataset and cover 33 
regional organisations (Ros) in the period from 1950 to 2010 (Hooghe et al. 2017), 
show the spread of the EU’s institutions. 
Figure 1 below shows the number of organisations that shared signature in-
stitutional features with the ECJ in 2010: (a) whether an organisation featured a 
permanent tribunal; (b) whether private actors and other treaty bodies had access 
to dispute settlement; (c) whether court rulings had a direct effect; and, (d) whether 
there was a preliminary rulings system by which national courts could send refer-
ences to the regional court. As the graph shows, there are a substantial number of 
Ros today that share authoritative institutional features of the ECJ – even though 
the number of each varies across these features. Whereas permanent tribunals by 
now exist in more than half of the Ros in our sample (17), rulings that have a direct 
effect in the legal system of member states feature in about a fourth of the ROs 
(8) – with private access (14) and preliminary rulings (10) located somewhere in 
between. 
Regional policymakers do not merely copy individual elements of the ECJ, but 
sometimes the entire institution. Figure 2 below shows the number of organisations 
that share at least three of the aforementioned four institutional features of the ECJ 
over time. As we can see, this number has grown continuously, starting with the 
creation of the Andean Court of Justice in 1983. In 2010, there were 11 operational 
copies of the ECJ to be found across most parts of the world – a third of the sample. 
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The European Commission, the second supranational institution of the EU, acts as a 
general secretariat and features some institutional characteristics that were unique 
within international cooperation in the 1950s. It not only has an  exclusive right to 
initiate secondary legislation, but also fulfils executive tasks  alongside its adminis-
trative role. The idea of the founding fathers was to establish an  authoritative body 
that is committed to the interests of the entire organisation, not only to those of 
individual member states. Figure 3 below shows the number of organisations that 
 accorded, again in 2010, the general secretariat (a) the power to  initiate the  adoption 
of secondary legislation and (b) an exclusive right to do so. We see that two thirds of 
Ros now accord agenda-setting competence to its general  secretariats (22), while 
an exclusive such right is still comparatively rare (3). The Junta of the Andean Com-
munity also fell into the latter category until the Quito Protocol of 1987, which al-
lowed member states – alongside the Junta – to submit proposals to the Commis-
sion, the decision-making organ. The three general secretariats with a monopoly to 
initiate secondary legislation also dispose of executive competences, and thus combine 
both of the signature features of the EC. All three are located in Africa (Southern Afri-
can Development Community, SADC, Economic and monetary Community of Central 
Figure 1
Number of  Regional 
Organisations 
 Sharing Signature 
 Institutional Features 
with the ECJ, 2010, 
N=33
Source: Based on data 
from Hooghe et al. (2017).
Figure 2
Number of Regional 
Organisations  Sharing 
Most or All of the Sig-
nature Institutional 
Features of the ECJ, 
1960–2010, N=33
Source: Based on data 
from Hooghe et al. (2017).
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African States, and the Economic Community of West African States, ECoWAS). The 
European Commission model is less popular elsewhere than the ECJ one, however.
Finally, the early EU was the second organisation in the world (after the Council 
of Europe) that endowed not only governments but also parliamentarians with in-
stitutionalised opportunities to participate in regional cooperation.  The Common 
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community was primarily designed as 
a counterweight to control the uniquely authoritative High Authority, but it also 
had consultative powers in policymaking from its inception. The story of its em-
powerment is well known: starting with legislative competences on the budget in 
the 1970s, the EP – as it has been called since 1958 – has worked to become a true 
co-legislator besides the Council of ministers. Figure 4 below shows the number 
of Ros in 2010 that disposed of a parliamentary institution composed of elected 
parliamentarians (a) with consultative powers only, (b) with legislative powers, 
and (c) that were directly elected in at least some of its member states. The graph 
shows that parliamentary institutions have become widespread as consultative bod-
ies within Ros, but EU-type institutions that have legislative competences and are 
directly elected are still extremely rare: only the East African Legislative Assembly 
has the competence to legislate, and the Andean Parliament and the Central Ameri-
can Parliament are directly elected.  
Figure 3
Number of Regional 
Organisations That 
Accord Agenda-Setting 
Competence to Their 
General Secretariat in 
Policymaking, 2010, 
N=33
Source: Based on data 
from Hooghe et al. (2017).
Figure 4
Number of Regional 
Organisations with a 
Parliamentary Insti-
tution, 2010, N=33
Source: Based on data 
from Hooghe et al. (2017).
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Taken together, the EU’s supranational institutions have spread to other parts of 
the world – wholly or in part – to various degrees. Whereas the ECJ model has be-
come a real export hit, the European Commission and the EP remain more  modest 
as institutional models – although Ros around the world have adopted some of 
their respective elements. Whereas policymakers within most Ros cherry-pick ele-
ments of the EU model to assemble their own brand of regional cooperation, SADC 
(before the abolition of the SADC Tribunal), the African Union, and ECoWAS have 
adopted most of its signature tenets.
… through EU Diffusion, Growing Interdependence, and  Community
The reasons why policy-makers in other regions adopt EU-style institutions are 
 diverse and diffusion from the EU is only one factor, which comes in two forms (see 
Lenz and Burilkov 2017).
The first such form is active EU diffusion. Born out of its own experience with 
regional cooperation and integration in bolstering peace and improving the pros-
perity of member states, European policymakers already began in the 1960s to 
support regional cooperation among their former respective colonies in Africa. 
Interregional cooperation with the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states 
sought to foster regional cooperation among those states themselves. This policy 
was extended in the 1970s and 1980s to existing Ros in Asia (Association of South-
east Asian Nations, ASEAN), Latin America (Andean Pact, Integration System of 
Central America), and the middle East (Gulf Cooperation Council). Today, the EU 
has regular interaction with many Ros around the world, and it continues to main-
tain interregional contacts with regions that do not have a formal representative 
organisation – such as the Barcelona Process with the mediterranean countries, or 
the Asia–Europe meeting (ASEm). Within these interregional contexts, the EU has 
advertised the “lessons” of European integration to other organisations that have 
been willing to listen – with it actively seeking to export its model of institutional-
ised regional cooperation. 
The toolbox that the EU uses for this purpose encompasses a number of 
 foreign policy instruments. As part of the Community’s development policy, the 
 European Commission provides financial and technical assistance to strengthen re-
gional  cooperation. For example the Commission has supported the strengthening 
of  ASEAN’s general secretariat, and it helped to build the SADC’s Tribunal (Lenz 
2012) – which was inaugurated in 2005 and then dismantled again after a contro-
versial ruling in 2013 (Nathan 2013). 
As part of the Community’s trade policy, meanwhile, it negotiates coopera-
tion and trade agreements with other Ros or groups of countries in an attempt 
to strengthen regional market-building. Negotiations with the Southern Common 
market (mercosur) – a Ro in South America – over an interregional trade agree-
ment, which started in the late 1990s and continue to this day, are a prominent 
example. And, as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Community 
conducts interregional political dialogues with other organisations and groups of 
countries in order to strengthen political cooperation and coordinate joint positions 
on international issues.
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The second form of influence is passive EU diffusion. The emulation of the EU’s 
institutions and policies does not require active promotion, with the European ex-
perience existing for everyone to see and learn from. As Pascal Lamy, a former com-
missioner of trade, once quipped: “Regionalism may be a European invention, but 
it is not protected by copyright law!” (Lamy 2001). Especially when institutional 
designs seem successful in solving cooperation problems, they can serve as institu-
tional templates for other organisations facing similar challenges. The EU is widely 
considered the most successful Ro in the world, and it has attracted many propo-
nents globally. one example that I have personally studied is a Filipino parliamen-
tarian, José de Venecia, who has worked relentlessly for the establishment of a par-
liamentary institution akin to the EP within ASEAN for the past three decades. With 
the ASEAN charter and subsequent developments, the parliamentary institution – 
which has existed as an independent body since the 1970s – achieved formalised 
access to the organisation’s decision-making processes (Lenz, forthcoming). Such 
passive EU diffusion can be self-reinforcing. As more and more organisations adopt 
EU-type institutions, ideas about the appropriate institutional design for a Ro are 
updated; this also increases pressure on other organisations to adapt as well.
Active and passive diffusion are not the only reasons for the spread of EU-style 
institutions, which still feature among the most authoritative in the world of inter-
national cooperation. There are at least two other conditions that have facilitated 
movement towards strong regional institutions, and these are related to the struc-
tural environment in which regional cooperation is embedded. The first facilitating 
condition is growing interdependence between states. Globalisation implies that 
governments are finding it increasingly difficult to solve problems by themselves. 
Consider how issues as diverse as economic growth, peace and security, or clean 
air spill across national borders and require international cooperation. Under con-
ditions of interdependence, more authoritative institutions may be functionally 
desirable to maintain or improve the effectiveness of ROs – because such insti-
tutions have the capacity to facilitate intergovernmental bargaining, to generate 
policy-relevant expertise, and to monitor compliance with decisions. once regional 
institutions, which help states to manage interdependence, reach a certain level of 
authority they start resembling those of the EU. 
The second facilitating condition is community (Hooghe, Lenz, and marks, 
forthcoming). Groups of states that share common norms find it easier to  cooperate 
on the basis of highly incomplete contracts; that is, treaties that stipulate only 
the goals of cooperation rather than specific means and concrete measures. For 
 example, the North American Free Trade Agreement – with its more than 1,000 
pages of text – is a relatively complete contract, whereas the three-page Bangkok 
Declaration that founded the ASEAN forms a highly incomplete one. Incomplete 
contracts are easier to adjust to unforeseen circumstances, and they provide more 
scope for institutional evolution. In fact, incomplete contracting requires institu-
tional evolution in line with the shifting content of cooperation. Yet, their incom-
pleteness generates ambiguity about whether an action conforms to the contract or 
not. only member states that share common norms are willing to enter into such 
contracts because they are less fearful of neighbours that may exploit the  ambiguity 
inherent in incomplete contracting. As such, normative commonality through in-
complete contracting facilitates the creation of more authoritative regional institu-
tions that may eventually resemble those of the EU.
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But EU-Type Institutions Function Differently in Different Parts 
of the World 
The fact that Ros in other parts of the world have, to varying degrees, adopted 
EU-style institutions does not mean that they have become “mini-EUs” in  reality. 
Institutional practices and outcomes continue to be diverse across the world, and 
many Ros have been less successful than the EU – especially when it comes to 
liberalising trade, the core purpose of many of these organisations. Expert  surveys 
indicate that the EU is still, by some margin, the most effective regional trade 
organisation in the world, with most Ros in the Global South lagging behind (Gray 
and Slapin 2012). 
Why, then, do EU-type institutions often not translate into EU-type practices 
and outcomes? The reason for this is intuitive: even if policymakers adopt EU-type 
institutions, these do not enter into a vacuum elsewhere but rather meet pre-ex-
isting local conditions and historical experiences, which shape their operation. As 
such conditions and experiences vary across regions, EU-type institutions do not pro-
duce EU-type outcomes. I want to highlight two conditions (see Lenz 2013: 218–219). 
The first important difference is attitudes towards national sovereignty. In 
 Europe, the unfettered pursuit of national sovereignty was widely discredited 
 after the unprecedented destruction of World War Two, while governments in the 
1950s and 1960s were aware that only by pursuing far-reaching regional coop-
eration would they be able to “rescue the nation state” (milward 1992). This was 
 particularly true of Germany, the largest and most powerful West European state. 
 Germany’s unprecedented willingness to share national sovereignty with its neigh-
bours in  order to facilitate regional cooperation can only be understood against this 
unique historical background.
The historical context in other regions is very different. Not only were most 
states elsewhere spared the experience of events as destructive as World War Two 
(even though many countries were affected by it), and with it having less willingness 
to share national sovereignty in the pursuit of “national survival.” The postcolonial 
context, in which many of these states are embedded, also means that states in other 
parts of the world rarely perceive supranational institutions as  opportunities to “re-
gain” national sovereignty by pooling it but as outright threats to such  sovereignty in 
fact. Thus Ros regularly deprive EU institutions of their most authoritative  features 
when adopting them, such as by endowing parliamentary institutions with consul-
tative rather than legislative competences. Some of the institutional similarities 
between other ROs and the EU are rather superficial, then. Where EU institutions 
have travelled more wholesale in terms of formal competences, member states may 
still use informal channels to inhibit EU-type functioning. For example, patrimo-
nial networks in staffing decisions or a deliberate lack of financial resources being 
provided hamper the functioning of regional institutions in many parts of the world 
presently (Gray 2018). 
Beyond divergent historical experiences, structural reasons also explain  continued 
differences in the institutional practice of regional cooperation between the EU and 
other world regions. The relative lack of economic complementarity between  member 
states as well as limited domestic capacity have been cited as reasons for why other 
regions generally lag behind the EU vis-à-vis the successful undertaking of eco-
nomic cooperation, even if they pursue similar objectives (Mattli 1999; Gray 2014). 
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Recent research on the functioning of regional courts has furthermore identified the 
societal conditions that facilitate the form of expansionist law-making that charac-
terised legal integration in the EU, and contributed much to the success of Euro-
pean integration. Regional courts tend to be more expansionist in their rule-making 
when there are sub-state and societal interlocutors – such as national judiciaries, 
advocacy networks, and administrative agencies – that encourage such an expan-
sive interpretation of formal competences on the part of judges and facilitate com-
pliance with courts’ rulings. Whereas the Andean Court of Justice is an institutional 
copy of the ECJ, for example, it has been much more protective of national sover-
eignty in its rulings due to different societal conditions (Alter and Helfer 2010). 
And the Future? EU Crises and the Attractiveness of its Model 
EU-type institutions have seldom produced similar institutional practices and out-
comes, yet the EU nevertheless has still served as a model – or an inspiring  example – 
in many parts of the world for a long time now. What are the consequences of the 
current EU crises for such perceptions, then? An answer to this question is nec-
essarily speculative, but I want to suggest that different types of crisis have different 
repercussions for the attractiveness of the EU model abroad. Whereas the EU’s 
policy crises have tainted its image as a successful organisation only temporarily, 
Brexit – the United Kingdom’s impeding withdrawal from the EU – constitutes a 
more fundamental challenge because it questions the EU’s very mode of integra-
tion. much of the critique by the advocates of Brexit (“Brexiteers”) is shared by 
a significant section of the population in respective EU member states, including 
some of its core countries.
over the past decade, the EU has had to contend with a number of major chal-
lenges that have triggered heated debates within the EU’s institutions and many of 
its member states – colloquially, these challenges have been referred to as “crises.” 
one of these challenges was the European debt crisis, or Euro crisis – a multi- annual 
difficulty of several European countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain) in repaying their government debt or in bailing out over-indebted banks. 
Another crisis was related to large movements of refugees and migrants from the 
middle East and Africa to Europe (“migration crisis”). Finally, there is the Brexit 
limbo, which – if it does ultimately happen – would be the first time since the begin-
ning of European integration that a member state has ever left the Union. 
These crises have tainted the EU’s image as a successful Ro because they ap-
peared to put an end to, first, a long phase of relatively “smooth” functioning since 
the early 1990s – when the UK was forced to leave the European Exchange Rate 
mechanism in preparation for the introduction of the Euro – and, second, the con-
tinued attractiveness of membership in the EU. This was indicated by the enlarge-
ment to 10 Central and Eastern European countries throughout the first decade of 
the new millennium. These crises were widely picked up on in other parts of the 
world, and they indicate to many outside observers that the EU is facing severe 
challenges – testing its ability to find workable compromises on some of its core 
issues. Thus, the EU’s external image strongly depends on whether it will be able to 
“solve” these key underlying problems. 
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In particular, it became clear to outside observers that two important policy 
regimes – the common currency and Europe’s policy on migration – are inoperable 
as currently conceived. The Euro crisis revealed that a currency union without a  fiscal 
union, meaning a common tax and fiscal policy, is difficult to maintain in the long run 
because it deprives national governments of an important policy tool to respond to 
crises (monetary policy) while also hampering their ability to respond jointly at the 
supranational level due to a lack of suitable instruments. Similarly, the migration crisis 
showed that the Dublin Convention of 1990 – which regulates the asylum process in 
the EU and marks the external counterpart to the internal free movement stipulations 
of the maastricht Treaty (“Schengen”) – distributes the burdens of asylum-seeking 
highly unevenly across EU member states as it requires such individuals to make 
their application to stay in the first country that they arrive in. Even though both of 
these policy crises have difficult structural problems at their heart, the EU has been 
able to manage them by muddling through while trying to agree upon more sustain-
able solutions in the medium term. To the extent that the EU is able to find such 
solutions, these policy crises have not damaged the EU’s image irreparably so far. 
However, finding solutions to these problems is increasingly tied up with the 
EU’s ability to engineer consensus on what are domestically highly contested policy 
issues – and this capacity is steadily deteriorating with the ongoing rise of right-wing 
populist parties in many EU member states. These new political actors contest 
 European integration not for its inability to find appropriate policy solutions to 
important political problems – a characteristic of much of the left-wing criticism of the 
EU – but rather the authority of the EU and other international organisations even 
in principle (see Hooghe, Lenz, and marks 2018). In a speech launching her cam-
paign for the 2017 presidential race, marine Le Pen made globalisation the enemy – 
linking it to Islamist fundamentalism as a force that will “subjugate our country” 
and “make our nation disappear.” Le Pen promised to pull France out of the Euro-
zone, the North Atlantic Treaty organization, and, more generally, to regain “our 
territorial sovereignty” (cited in Hooghe, Lenz, and marks 2018: 7). Not only Le Pen 
and the French National Rally, but also other political actors on the populist right 
such as matteo Salvini and the Northern League in Italy or Geert Wilders and the 
Party for Freedom and Progress in the Netherlands reject international organisa-
tion both in principle as well as in practice. Hungarian prime minister Viktor orban 
recently reiterated to the German daily newspaper Bild his objections to the EU’s 
migration policies, by arguing that they threaten the “sovereignty and cultural iden-
tity” of Hungary meanwhile.
Despite crises and difficulties, most of the EU’s history was characterised by 
a pragmatic attitude towards sovereignty according to which governments were 
willing to pool it in the interest of joint gains. Today, populist right-wing parties – 
whose rise is only likely to continue – display a more principled attitude that re-
gards national sovereignty as indivisible. This is also at the core of the Brexiteer 
agenda, which was successful in mobilising more than half of the UK’s electorate 
around the idea to “take back control” – as the catchy slogan has it – by leaving the 
EU. While the UK has long been the most Eurosceptic of EU member states, the rise 
of right-wing populism in many EU countries indicates that this core idea falls on 
fertile political grounds not only in that one alone. To the extent that this attitude 
gains further ground going forward, the process of European integration as it has 
progressed previously is unlikely to continue. 
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What does this mean for the continued attractiveness of the EU model? Despite 
these difficulties, predictions of the irrelevance and imminent demise of the EU 
model are premature. The historic achievements of the EU in contributing to peace 
and prosperity in its member states are seen more clearly beyond its shores than 
in some political milieus within it. Even though the EU is undergoing its most pro-
found “crisis of external image” to date, the idea that regional cooperation can help 
nation states to secure peace and enhance economic welfare will remain attractive – 
and the EU will continue to be its most prominent example.
This image is a resource in the EU’s foreign policy that policymakers would do 
well to tap into. It endows the EU with credibility not only in its worldwide promo-
tion of regional cooperation, but also in its efforts to strengthen multilateralism 
more broadly. The EU remains a microcosm of how countries with different his-
torical experiences, economic and social structures, as well as varying preferences 
can cooperate to the benefit of all through a sophisticated system of both negotia-
tion and compromise. In this respect, the EU may serve as a promising example in 
a world in which material inequality and normative divergence too often impair 
much-needed global cooperation. Yet, fulfilling this potential also entails keeping 
the EU’s own house “in order.” The attractiveness of the EU model depends, then, 
on the Union’s continued ability to solve difficult cooperation issues and to cope 
with crises that threaten its very unity. Especially in the current political climate 
in Europe and elsewhere, in which a cooperative attitude between governments 
cannot be taken for granted, being able to maintain productive international coop-
eration would send a particularly strong sign that negotiation and compromise are 
worthwhile, and indeed vital, undertakings. 
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